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Abstract
Several recently proposed block ciphers such as AES, Camellia, Shark, Square and Hierocrypt use s-boxes that are based on the
inversion mapping over GF(2n). In order to hide the simple algebraic structure in this mapping, an afﬁne transformation over F2 is
usually used after the output of the s-box. In some ciphers, an additional afﬁne transformation is used before the input of the s-box
as well. In this paper, we study the algebraic properties of a simple approximation in the form s(x)= ax−1 + b, a, b ∈ GF(2n) for
such s-boxes. The implication of this result on the cryptanalysis of these ciphers remains an open problem.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Differential [2] and linear cryptanalysis [11] are two of the most powerful attacks on iterative symmetric key block
ciphers. The complexity of linear cryptanalysis depends on the size of the maximum entry in the linear approximation
table of theBoolean functions used to construct the round function. Similarly, the complexity of differential cryptanalysis
depends on the size of the largest entry of the XOR table of these Boolean functions. In [13], Nyberg suggested an
s-box which is optimized towards these two criteria. Nyberg s-box is based on the inversion mapping
f (x) = x−1, x ∈ GF(2n), f (0) = 0.
The main disadvantage of this s-box is its simple algebraic description (by deﬁnition) over GF(2n) [7] which may
enable some attacks such as the interpolation attacks [8,9]. In order to overcome this problem, this mapping was
modiﬁed in a way that does not modify its resistance towards both linear and differential cryptanalysis while the overall
s-box description becomes complex inGF(2n). The Nyberg s-box construction (with n=8) was adopted in many block
ciphers such as Shark [15], Square [3], AES [4–6,12], Camellia [1], and Hierocrypt [14]. Both AES and Camellia are
of particular interest since AES is the current standard adopted by NIST and Camellia is included in the NESSIE (New
European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption) portfolio of recommended cryptographic primitives.
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In order to hide the simple algebraic structure in this mapping, Shark, Square and AES use an afﬁne transformation
over F2 after the output of the inversion mapping. In Camellia, an additional afﬁne transformation is used before
the input of the s-box as well. These afﬁne transformations prove to be useful in preventing low-degree polynomial
approximations in GF(2n). For example, using exhaustive search, we veriﬁed that the best third-degree polynomial
approximation for the AES s-box holds with p=11/256.Meanwhile, other simple (sparse) polynomial approximations
may still prove to be useful for the cipher cryptanalysis. In this paper, we study the algebraic properties of a simple
approximation in the form s(x) = ax−1 + b, a, b ∈ GF(2n) for the overall s-box. Our result applies to all s-boxes in
the form s(x) = L1((L2(x))d) where L1, L2 are invertible afﬁne transformations over GF(2) and gcd(n, d) = 1.
2. Mathematical background and deﬁnitions
For a background about the general theory of ﬁnite ﬁelds, the reader is referred to [10]. Throughout this paper, we
will use the hexadecimal notation to denote the ﬁeld elements (e.g., let  denote the primitive element used to construct
the ﬁnite ﬁeldGF(2n), then the ﬁeld element bn−1n−1+bn−2n−2 +· · ·+b22 +b1+b0, bi ∈ {0, 1}, is represented
by the hexadecimal number consisting of bits (bn−1bn−2 · · · b1b0)).
Deﬁnition 1. A polynomial having the special form
L(x) =
t∑
i=0
ix
2i (1)
with coefﬁcients i from GF(2n) is called a linearized polynomial over GF(2n).
Lemma 1. There is a 1 − 1 correspondence between the set of invertible linear transformations over Fn2 and the set
of linearized polynomials over GF(2n) [10].
Deﬁnition 2. Let S be a subgroup of GF(2n). A coset of S is a subset of GF(2n) whose elements can be expressed as
x + S = {s + S, s ∈ S}.
Lemma 2. The distinct cosets of a subgroup S in a group G are disjoint.
Lemma 3. The zeroes of L(x) form a subspace of GF(2n).
The following lemma [16] illustrates the effect of applying a linear transformation to the output coordinates of f on
the coefﬁcients of its corresponding polynomial.
Lemma 4. Let F(x1, . . . , xn)= (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)) be the Boolean function corresponding to the polynomial function
f (x)= xd over GF(2n). Let G(x) be the Boolean mapping obtained by applying a linear transformation to the output
coordinates of f (x1, . . . , xn). Then the polynomial function corresponding to G can be expressed as
g(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
cix
d2i , ci ∈ GF(2n). (2)
Proof. The proof follows directly by applying Lemma 1. 
It is straight forward to show that if the linear transformation is replaced by an afﬁne one, then g(x) can be expressed
as
g(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
cix
d2i + cn, ci ∈ GF(2n).
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Example 1. Using Lagrange interpolation over GF(28), where GF(28) is deﬁned by the irreducible polynomial
8 + 4 + 3 +  + 1, the AES s-box can be expressed as
s(x) = 63 + 05x254×1 + 09x254×2 + f 9x254×4 + 25x254×8
+ f 4x254×16 + 01x254×32 + b5x254×64 + 8f x254×128.
By noting that for x ∈ GF(2n), xa = xa mod 2n−1, then we have
s(x) = 63 + 05x254 + 09x253 + f 9x251 + 25x247
+ f 4x239 + 01x223 + b5x191 + 8f x127.
3. Monomial approximations for AES-like s-boxes
In this section, we present some algebraic properties for the afﬁne transformations used in AES-like s-boxes. We
also show some simple monomial approximations for these s-boxes.
Theorem 1. Let s(x)=L1((L2(x))d) where L1, L2 are afﬁne transformations over GF(2) and gcd(n, d)=1. Then ∃
a, {b1, b2, . . . , b2n−m} for which the approximation s(x)= axd + bi holds with probability p = 2m/2n for some integer
m1. Moreover,
⋃
bi
{x|axd + bi = xd} spans the whole vector space of GF(2n).
Proof. The effect of the input transformation, L2, can be moved to the output by changing the basis in which we
perform the ﬁnite ﬁeld computations. Thus, using the new basis, the above s-box is equivalent to another s-box in the
form s1(x)=L3(xd), L3 =L1L−12 . From Lemma 4, s1(x) can be expressed as s1(x)=
∑n−1
i=0 cixd2
i
. Hence, the number
of times inwhich the approximation s1(x)=axd holds is equivalent to the number of zeroes of the linearized polynomial
(a + c0)xd +∑n−1i=1 cixd2
i
. From Lemma 3, this number is in the form 2m for some integer m ∈ {0, . . . , n}.Let X1
denote the subgroup for which the approximation s1(x) = L3(xd) = axd holds. Thus ∀x ∈ X1 and ∀ki ∈ GF(2n)
such that (x + ki) ∈ X1, we have L3(x) = ax ⇒ L3(x + ki) = a(x + ki) ⇒ L3(x) = ax + aki + L3(ki) = ax + bi
⇒ bi = aki + L3(ki). The second part of the theorem follows from Lemma 2 and by noting that if |X1| = 2m, then we
have 2n−m different choices of ki such that x + ki belong to a different coset. In order to prove that m ≥ 1, we note
that x = 0 is always a zero of the polynomial (a + c0)xd +∑n−1i=1 cixd2
i
. For a =∑n−1i=0 ci , we have another zero at
x = 1 and hence m ≥ 1. 
Example 2. Let s(x)=L(x−1), x ∈ GF(24) where GF(24) is deﬁned by the irreducible polynomial x4 + x + 1, and
L is given by
L =
⎡
⎢⎣
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Then we have
s(x) = 9x−1 if x ∈ {0, 1, 4, 5, a, b, e, f },
= 9x−1 + 5 if x ∈ {2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, c, d}.
LetLpˆ denote the number of invertible linear transformations for which the best approximation of the formL(x)=ax
holds with probability pˆ, i.e.,
pˆ = max
a∈GF(2n)
|{x|L(x−1) = ax−1}|
2n
.
Finding an expression for the distribution Lpˆ over all randomly selected linear transformations seem to be a hard
combinatorial problem. Table 1 shows the distribution of Lpˆ for all the invertible linear transformations over F2 for
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Table 1
Lpˆ distribution for n = 4
pˆ 216
4
16
8
16 1
Lpˆ 30 18540 1575 15
Table 2
Lpˆ distribution for 10,000 randomly selected linear transformations, n = 8
pˆ 4256
8
256
16
256
Lpˆ 2271 7446 283
Table 3
{a, bi }-pairs for the AES s-box
a b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16
5f e 15 23 38 4e 55 63 78 8e 95 a3 b8 ce d5 e3 f 8
ae 17 1a 20 2d 54 59 63 6e 91 9c a6 ab d2 df e5 e8
1f b 11 25 3f 4d 57 63 79 87 9d a9 b3 c1 db ef f 5
Table 4
{a, bi }-pairs for the Shark and Square s-box
a b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16
ac 6 15 22 31 46 55 62 71 86 95 a2 b1 c6 d5 e2 f 1
n = 4. Table 2 shows the distribution of Lpˆ for 10000 randomly selected invertible linear transformations over F2 for
n = 8.
Using the irreducible polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1, Table 3 shows the different {a, bi} pairs for which the
approximation s(x) = ax−1 + bi holds for the AES s-box. Thus for AES, we have pˆAES = 16/256.
Similarly, using the irreducible polynomial 8 + 7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 2 + 1, Table 4 shows the corresponding pairs
of the Shark (and Square) s-box. Thus we also have pˆShark = pˆSquare = 16/256. Since many randomly selected linear
transformations have pˆ = 4/256< pˆAES = 16/256, one can conclude that the linear transformation of these ciphers
performs worse than randomly selected linear transformations in hiding approximations of the above form.
Similar approximations were found for the Camellia s-boxes. For example, for S1, S2, S3, pˆ = 8/256. However,
Camellia uses four s-boxes. The linear transformation at the input of S4 is different from that at the input of S1, S2, S3
which prevents us from ﬁnding one set of basis for which all our approximations hold. When applying our approach
to the Hierocrypt s-box, we have pˆ = 8/256.
4. Conclusions
The main design objective of the AES-like s-boxes’ afﬁne transformations is to hide simple algebraic relations
over GF(2n). In this paper, we showed that some simple approximations are still possible. While the implication
of our results on the cryptanalysis of AES and other ciphers remains an open problem, special care should be taken
when designing linear transformations that hide the GF(2n) structure within monomial-based s-boxes. For exam-
ple, if we replace the afﬁne transformation of the AES s-box (denote it by LAES) with L′ obtained by applying
LAES to itself, i.e., L′(x) = LAES(LAES(x)), then we can obtain approximations of the above form that hold with
pˆ = 64/256.
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One should also note that while the approximations introduced in this paper hold with a relatively small probability,
the possibility of discovering a clever method for concatenating these approximations so that the overall round function
may also have some simple (sparse) approximation over GF(2n) should not be excluded. If such approximations exist,
then the overall cipher can be attacked using some of the recently proposed algebraic attacks.
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